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LITERATURE AND THE NEW ANTI-INTELLEC-
TUALISM 
Natura in est mentibus nostris insatiabilis 
quredam cupiditas veri videndi. Cicero-
Tusc. QU(£st. 
" Never has he drawn so deeply from the well that is the hu-
man heart; never so near those invisible heights which are the 
sou1." The reviewer who wrote this sentence probably meant 
that the author of the book he so enthusiastically welcomed wrote 
with a little more than the ordinary insight. Indeed if we are to 
judge from the encomiums in our less critical reviews the world 
has never been so blessed with novels and plays which touch the 
secret springs of the heart. The old fiction had generalised, had 
conventionalised, much as the old art had done. This, to the 
new, is all wrong. The type characters, let us say, of Thackeray 
and even of George Eliot were interesting enough, but often as 
faulty as the old drawings of a galloping horse, which showed him 
with feet extended in an arc. As the art of photography has 
taught us that the horse has always one of his feet on or near the 
ground, so the new psychology has put us on our guard against 
accepting too literally such personages as Becky Sharp, Colonel 
Newcome, or Silas Marner. These pictures of life are entirely 
too set, far too regular for an adequate portrayal of life itself. 
The new fiction is to present life itself, "to draw deeply from the 
well that is the human heart," to mount "near the invisible 
heights which are the sou1." And thus vivisectionist-wise, the 
writers of to-day stand, with scalpel and forceps delicately poised, 
before a clinic of admiring readers. 
But all this implies a fundamental change in point of view. 
For of a surety the old writers of novels and dramas did not 
have a distrust of reality that led them to adopt an ancient 
maxim and when supping with it to use a long spoon; they 
did not feel that it was unreality they were picturing. Per-
haps the change is as tersely put by Mr. Scott James in his 
Modernism and Romance as by any: "With the advent of 
science, metaphysics, and psychology, and the practical ana-
logies of these studies, we have come, like Adam after the 
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fall, into a new state of knowledge which is altering our sus-
ceptibilities and our artistic standpoints." It is this new 
knowledge, then, that is playing such havoc with our literary 
tradition. We must back to reality by the route of science, and 
metaphysics, and their practical analogies. Whether it be a 
dreary one or no, the critic, too, must follow. Wi11 the quest 
reveal a glimpse of the promised land or of a shimmering mirage? 
I 
The old ideal of science, when its method seemed on the 
point of swa110wing a11 our manifold intellectual activities, was 
perfectly clear. I t first fired the scientific imagination when 
Kepler enunciated his laws, came to be steadily discussed when 
Newton formulated his principle of universal gravitation, and 
fina11y became a fixed notion when Helmholz gave us his law of 
conservation of energy and Darwin his formula for evolution. 
It was an ideal almost elementary in its meaning. The scientist, 
in reaching out his hands after laws or hypotheses, was doing so 
under the profound conviction that these hypotheses pictured 
reality, and that there was a rational order in the universe, ever 
immutable, whose lineaments the human understanding might 
some day read and comprehend. 
The amazing simplicity of the ideal, its utter rationality, the 
equally amazing results which science was achieving with its aid in 
the physical world, made it one to which it was difficult to turn a 
deaf ear. Science became a word to conjure with, for it was 
expected to prove the open sesame to countless yet unopened 
mysteries. But like all terms much bandied about it fe11 upon 
evil days. Men spoke in its name to whom its method was never 
revealed. Besides, the glorious empire it was going to reveal 
seemed no nearer after the lapse of nearly half a century of most 
devout worship, so that even scientists themselves began to be 
divided in their belief of the final rigidity of the discovered laws. 
In addition, several of the most firmly entrenched hypotheses 
seemed threatened by the scientists' inability to force into them 
many newly discovered facts. Until it has finally come about in 
our time, that many persons in a11 fields have begun to turn their 
backs upon the ideal which but a short time ago promised so 
abundantly. As a result to-day an equally amazing thing is 
happening: orthodox scientists like Poincare have been compelled 
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to reply, justifying the ways of science and accurately setting 
forth her limitations and her strength. 
For many who find the ideal of science, as they fondly im-
agined it, to be an unrealisable one, or a faulty one, or an ut-
terly fallacious one, are turning to unorthodoxy, a metaphysical 
science, a scientific gnosticism as it were; and while acknowledg-
ing that science gives knowledge that may be turned to practical 
use, they maintain that science fails utterly, if its empirical 
methods are followed, to give any comprehension of reality, 
which instead can be got only by an unscientific, mystic rapport 
with the Ding an sick. So to them science, to gain truth, must 
forsake the rational, inductive and deductive, or generalising 
method, and, cutting its own throat, rush immediately into the 
presence of living reality. 
To these heterodox scientists science presents two phases, a 
positive and a negative. Within certain well defined limits it 
has still its amazing possibilities, but beyond these, as a measurer 
of truth or reality, or as an effort to unify our actual and possible 
knowledge, it can never be more than a chimera. In the words 
of Professor Royce: 
"The splendid triumphs of special research in the most various fields, the 
constant increase in our practical control over nature,-these, our positive 
and growing possessions, stand in glaring contrast to the failure of the scientific 
orthodoxy of a former period to fix the outlines of an ultimate creed about the 
nature of the knowable universe. Why not 'take the cash and let the credit 
go'? Why pursue the elusive theoretical' unification' any further, when what 
we daily get from our sciences is an increasing wealth of detailed information 
and of practical guidance? Why, then, does science actually need general 
theories, despite the fact that these theories inevitably alter and pass away?" 
Instead of regarding the scientific hypotheses as attempts to come 
to an understanding of reality, why not frankly, ask unorthodox 
theorists, regard them as the conventions of our logic-mongering 
intellect and let them go at that? Then, at least, they can be 
altered freely and as often as our new accumulations of fact may 
demand, and yet our conception of reality and truth vary never a 
whit. Besides, this would be so easy a way out of the great 
difficulty. Hypothesis must follow hypothesis; the path of 
science is strewn with outworn hypotheses, and yet we are never 
the nearer, if we must take hypotheses as our criteria, to a 
glimpse of the final truth. Why not frankly change hypotheses 
as we change our clothes, accepting them as mere arbitrary 
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wrappings for the naked, living truth within? And this position 
has a horde of followers from the scientist LeRoy to the philoso-
pher Bergson. 
Besides, many of these hypotheses, because of their paradoxi-
cal nature, require of their devotees an amazing power of credu-
lity. Indeed the opponents of orthodox science see in science a 
reign of empirical dogma which rivals that of the most literal of 
medireval theological dogmatists. In order to explain the 
phenomena of light and electro-magnetism, for example, we 
must assume the reality of ether, a substance, all pervasive, 
which is so subtle in texture that it in no way offers the slightest 
resistance to the passage of even such ethereal bodies as cometary 
appendages, so resistless in its penetrating power that it finds not 
the slightest difficulty in making its way unimpeded through the 
most refractory of substances; it is at the same time a million 
times less substantial than our most perfect vacuum and a 
million times more uncompromising than the finest tempered 
steel. Before this the dogma of even the Immaculate Concep-
tion sinks into an easy exercise. In consequence the revolt of 
the mind caught by a love of freedom and by a desire for revolt 
from dogma has gained a multitude of adherents. The victories 
of science are all well and good in the practical world of con-
ventional fact, but as to giving us a glimpse of reality, that is 
another matter. It is by such steps as these that there has 
arisen in our time a distrust of the intellect as a means of knowing 
reality. To be sure, this is not a new phenomenon. The old 
Upanishads of India are full of empirical and philosophical 
scepticism. Buddhism is founded upon the meagre achievements 
of man's intellect. The Greek Sceptics, the early Christian 
Gnostics, the scholastic Nominalists, the critical pietism of 
Pascal, are all influenced profoundly by the utter discrepancy 
between man's intellectual presumption and man's knowledge 
of reality and truth. But here there is this difference: these 
later anti-intellectualists attack the intellect in the field in which 
it had before been held to be supreme, the field of physical fact 
and science. The findings of science, save in the practical field 
of everyday life, are now meeting with distrust and hostile 
scepticism. 
The intellect deforms, or conventionalises all it touches; and 
this process is still more evident when it attempts to translate its 
findings into discourse. For language is also an intellectual, 
THE MID-WEST QUARTERLY 
conventionalised thing, with its static concepts, generalisations, 
the words by which living, changing, ever flowing, highly indi-
vidualised things must be communicated. The moment that 
language, the poor creature of the intellect, lays its strangling 
hand upon the living reality, its life is gone, its individuality lost, 
and we have only the poor husk, the shell, which hints no more of 
the life it once contained than the dead body of the beauty that 
once inspired ii. All of us at one time or another have felt this 
fatal insufficiency of pure speech; it is this that has inspired our 
heart-born appeal to the un sounded depths of the emotion. And 
it is from the heart alone, then, these anti-intellectualists argue, 
with its Ur-sprung in the heart of reality, that truth and reality 
may be known. Our deepest emotions, and fleeting, ever chang-
ing impressions, these alone can look truth in the face, for they 
share its nature; but even these when we attempt to communicate 
them, to translate them into words, turn to a shell of dust and 
ashes and vanish at a touch. 
This seems to be what the science that has the popular ear 
to-day has to say of life and reality. Facts which swim on the 
broad bosom of the stream of life we may see, experience, even 
measure, but to understand them in their relation to other facts, 
to generalise upon them, reduce them into systems, invent 
hypotheses to explain their similarity and dissimilarity, and to 
feel that these generalisations and hypotheses are more than 
little systems that have their day and cease to be, to feel that 
these are more than broken lights-all this is a vain pursuit of 
intellectual will-o'-the-wisps. The intellect is on stable ground 
only when it deals with concrete facts. When we abandon pure 
fact we must also abandon intellect. 
II 
There is no great gap to-day between the metaphysical 
scientists and the scientific metaphysicians. After all that has 
been written about Bergson and especially about the Creative 
Evolution, any attempt to summarise his philosophy would be 
gratuitous. I shall content myself merely with pointing out 
where he is distinctly anti-intellectual, unorthodox, and sceptical. 
It is a little difficult, I confess, to take M. Bergson seriously, 
and not to feel that he is not with tongue in cheek perpetrating 
a gigantic hoax on our bewildered age. Is not his attempt to 
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prove that the intellect and intellectual processes and generalisa-
tions have no compatibility with living truth and reality, in which 
he is compelled to use the very methods and terminology he 
denounces, not a little like sitting on the branch he is sawing off? 
What is the worth of his argument on the insufficiency of the 
reason if in his argument he is compelled to use the same despised 
reason? Why discourse so lengthily and so charmingly with 
proof and argument, when his thesis magniloquently places him 
beyond reason and unreason in the flux of the infinite duree? 
Bergson's chief contribution to modern thought is the new 
definition he has given to reality. In the first place he makes-
apparently, for he is not always clear on this point-a capital 
distinction between life and matter. So we have, to begin with, 
a dual universe with parts really distinct, and in many ways 
antagonistic. Life, as he puts it, is a constant, restless energy, 
moving ever upward and forward, ever creating the new, without 
bounds, without limit, without aim, for the moment we presuppose 
either we curtail the one and the only characteristic we may 
unhesitatingly impute to it-its perfect freedom. Matter is also 
a movement, as constant and resistless, but in inverse direction. 
Unlike life it has no spontaneous, self-directing power; it is mere 
inert agency, uncreative power, ungenerative, un-self-impelled 
flux. Unlike life, which bloweth where it listeth, this blows with-
out listing. Unlike life, which in its higher forms arrives at 
consciousness and free self-creation, matter carnes no potentiality 
save its own movement; it may never hope for consciousness or 
for creative power; it may only combine to form new movements 
which are but the result of the meeting of two material lines of 
force. Life is mobility creating new forms of life; matter is mo-
bility, combining, transforming, perpetuating its own mobility. 
Reality, then, is movement, a pure flux; and in essence Bergson's 
conception of it is closely allied to that gained some twenty-five 
hundred years ago by Heraclitus. The only new thing in Bergson 
is the way in which he relates this theory to the vast accumu-
lation of knowledge and science gained since that time. 
These ceaseless movements are the duree, true time, time in 
which clock hands do not move, nor ever cease from moving; 
time in which there is no past, present, or future, but all past, 
present, and future; time in which minutes do not crowd upon 
each other's heels, but in which minutes all disappear, or are spun 
to an eternity. For true time is not counted time, it is not clock 
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time, it is not sequence of isolated and individual moments, it is 
time in which time shall be no more, when a thousand years shall 
be a day and a day a thousand years, and when both shall lose 
their name and sink into pure undifferentiated flux. For this, to 
Bergson, is the secret of memory, when the past is caught up 
into and becomes the present, when a life, which is said to be 
spent in hours and days and years, suddenly flashes across the 
memory in an instant, and all the disjecta membra of its past 
history unite with the present in one moment of intense reverie or 
action, and reveal that a man's true life is not measured by 
chronometer or shadow on the dial, but by eternal and present 
movement. 
But these two movements, of life and matter, which are in 
essence quite distinct, in reality sadly interfere with each other's 
progress. Unfortunately for both they could not be or were not 
confined each to its own universe, but each passing through the 
other bewilders its energy, deflects its course, stays its passage; 
and the result is a grand confusion of life and not life, matter and 
not matter, where each apes the characteristics of the other. 
Matter takes some of the characteristics of life; and life becomes 
locked up in matter. It is this mutual confusion that causes 
both to assume the appearance of form. But this appearance is 
purely illusory; for though in appearance the form is static, 
unchanging, in reality the movement persists, form giving place 
to form, and naught abides but the utter changeableness of form 
in the flux of life and matter. There are no things; for these 
forms, which, to eyes clouded by the false concepts of time and 
space, appear to have a fixed, unchanging, and mutually externa-
lised life, are in reality, when seen by unclouded eyes, far other-
wise; they are the already disappearing organisation of life and 
matter which the restless flux exposes for an instant as it passes 
from generation to generation, making "the whole series of the 
living one single wave flowing over matter." One might wonder 
if, in the last analysis, there were any difference between this 
Heraclitan ideal of an infinite flux and the Buddhist ideal of an 
infinite rest, Nirvana. Are not both equally meaningless when 
measured in terms of infinity? 
Doubtless this doctrine is a little hard for the unaided intellect 
to comprehend. It was not meant for the intellect, Bergson 
would reply; and were he intellect alone he would never have 
arrived at this flowing conception of being. For the intellect to 
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him has a far different task from that of apprehending the nature 
of reality. 
As reality is divided into what should be mutually exclusive 
movements, life and matter, so consciousness is dichotomised 
into intuition and intellect. Like life and matter these two 
, functions of consciousness have also become subject to the grand 
confusion-it is marvellous how large confusion bulks in Bergson's 
universe. Instead of remaining each in the field it should have 
occupied, and which it might have explored with utter success, 
the two have been trespassing, and for so many years before 
Bergson made clear their several duties, that it is doubtful if poor 
humanity is ever again to have. a moment of clear vision. The 
fault, if fault there were, is all to be laid to man's meddling and 
presumptuous intellect. Both intellect and intuition stand 
before the world of reality and seek to comprehend its true nature: 
intuition by flashes of insight which might, were they not so 
pitifully infrequent, enable man to apprehend reality; intellect 
by the laborious process of induction and deduction, the practical 
method of science. But both attain to indifferent success; for 
what the intuition sees, it may not for want of a language 
communicate, and what the intellect communicates is the result 
of imperfect seeing, for its horizon is bounded by form and 
organisation, things and their relation in time and space, all of 
which possess no reality beyond the moment of the flux which 
gave them being. 
Now, by its nature intellect should have been fitted to deal 
directly with matter, as intuition with life, and man's conscious-
ness of reality would then have been complete; but-and here 
again is the fatal disjunctive in all Bergsonian philosophy-
experience gives us neither pure matter nor pure life. Instead 
we have matter and life that have interfered with each other, a 
deflected matter and an apparently tergiversated life, upon 
which our conscious processes greedily thrust themselves, for-
getting that life is more than form and matter more than static 
relations. Besides, the powers of the intuition have become 
atrophied by neglect. The intellect was early found to be a prac-
tical faculty, useful in invention and for action; hence man as he 
became more and more human began to use the faculty that set 
him apart more and more from the brute, and which enabled him 
to invent ever new and useful devices for his protection, for his 
comfort, for his diversion. Thus he relied more and more upon 
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his intellect, glorifying it as the one human quality that rendered 
him unique in the series of living beings, forgetting that in his 
instinct, his intuition, there lay another and still more powerful 
faculty which united him with all life, and which, were it de-
veloped, as he had developed his reason, would have enabled him 
to penetrate into the highest mysteries of life itself, would have 
let him know that life is movement, and that this world of things 
which the intellect so indefatigably buzzes around is but a sham 
world, a mere transient form which life and matter assume and 
then pass on, a mere moment in the eternal process of becoming 
"in which nothing becomes, and in which there is nothing that 
nothing becomes." Philosophy, then, to be true must "free 
itself from forms and habits that are strictly intellectua1." To 
know life and reality, "you must thrust intelligence outside itself 
by an act of wil1." 
Thus Bergson is anti-intellectualist, not because he distrusts 
the intellect, that would be to recognise that it had at least the 
power to comprehend reality even were its interpretation faulty, 
but because the world it deals with is no world at all, but merely 
a series of utterly false generalisations of things and their rela-
tions. Naturally it can apparently make these generalisations 
good because they possess no counterpart in the world of reality. 
It may do with them what it chooses, for they are its creation. A 
false generalisation is in essence, then, no worse, so far as reality 
is concerned, than a true one; for false and true are but like all 
generalisations merely intellect-created terms. The intellect has 
nothing in common with reality itself. 
There is something supremely dismal in this severe punish-
ment of the pretensions of the intellect. We had been by the 
old philosophers urged to leave the world of daydreams, reverie, 
castles in the air, and set our feet firmly upon the intellectual 
world of fact and logical form. Now we are told that this 
world of fact and form is the only untrue reality, that its creator 
the intellect is the gayest of deceivers, that its methods are utterly 
incapable of arriving at reality, that the only world of reality is 
that which we were once led to regard as empty-the world of 
dreams, reverie, and castles in the air. And yet in his Les Donnees 
Immediates and his Matiere et Memoire Bergson uses the very 
weapons of reason to make firm his contempt of reason. Is he 
not, again, a little paradoxical, like the painters of the Futurist 
School, who, to paint their hatred of form and their glory in 
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universal dynamism, as they call it, are compelled to use, though 
distorted beyond recognition, the very lines and colours of the 
classic artists? 
And what is the significance of such reality? But to put such a 
question is to betray one's ignorance of true reality. It has none, 
for significance is an intellect-created term. Reality, the duree, is 
beyond all intellect-created concepts. I t may not be generalised, 
because it is the great unique, the supra as well as the infra 
rational. We may not even speak of it, for speech is from and 
for the intellect alone. This the old Brahmin knows, better than 
Bergson, for devoiding his mind of aught of sense and intelligence, 
squatted cross-legged on the banks of the resistless and flowing 
Ganges, the symbol of true time, and gazing at his navel, the pre-
sent symbol of the union of generation to generation, he mutters 
the mystic vocables, Om, Mani, Padni, Hum; and in their mean-
ingless resonance, because it is meaningless, he feels himself gra-
dually uplifted from all these trivialities and similarities and 
irritating complexes, which those who have not wisdom call life, 
into the very heart of life itself, the true reality. The trouble 
with M. Bergson is that he is not thoroughgoing enough, he lacks 
the courage of his intuitive convictions. I am reminded of a line 
in the Upanishads a friend quoted to me: " Children follow after 
outward pleasures, and fall into the widespread net of death; but 
wise men knowing what is the state of things immortal do not 
seek for things stable here among things unstable." For, as the 
Brahmin philosopher knows, the restless, ever-changing flux of 
life, as we apperceive it in our emotions or our intuitions, has no 
more stable ground for its truth than our reasoned abstractions; 
hence, passing from intuition to intuition, he transcends the flux 
and arrives at a static conception of pure being, of which nothing 
can be predicated, Nirvana. 
Nor is pragmatism essentially different from other anti-
intellectualist philosophies. In the last analysis it reduces 
philosophy, which is usually defined as a search for truth, to a 
matter of temperament. The corollaries, then, seem quite 
reasonable, that inasmuch as there are many temperaments, 
there must also be many philosophies; and that any philosophy 
which furnishes a modicum of satisfaction, must, per se, in that 
measure be true. This is not so far as one might think from 
Bergson's view that the heart alone is the criterion of truth. In 
full accordance with these corollaries, truth is for the pragmatist 
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a relative thing altogether, for truth is that which has a distinct 
"cash value," it is " a class-name for all sorts of definite working-
values in experience. " There is nothing final about it, as there is 
nothing final about pragmatism itself. "It agrees with nominal-
ism . . . in always appealing to particulars; with utilitarian-
ism in emphasising practical aspects, with positivism in its 
disdain for verbal solutions, useless questions, and metaphysical 
abstractions.' , 
Thus, again, in the metaphysics that passes current to-day we 
have left nothing but facts and intuitions, the one careless, dis-
continuous, insignificant, the other formless, everfiowing, without 
aim and without end. The intellect deals with the one, the 
intuition with the other; and any attempt to reconcile them is 
effort put forth in vain. Is this an adequate artistic standpoint? 
III 
But literature and art are for their ideas more intimately 
dependent upon morals than upon science and philosophy. How, 
then, has ethics, the science of morals, as we have perhaps un-
advisedly termed it, reacted during this widespread repudiation 
of reason and the intellect? 
Naturally, of all possible subjects, ethics, the subject which 
deals directly with human conduct, was early and until quite 
recently believed to be the one that should be most easily appre-
hended by human reason. Why man does this or refuses to do 
that, and why this is a good deed and that evil, for such questions 
it was felt that reason and reason alone could furnish an adequate 
answer. The nature and content of the good and of the bad, 
surely in so far as these ideas possess a purely human value, they 
must be within the power of the human instrument to compre-
hend and to rationalise into a system. Thus arose the numerous 
systems of ethics from the earliest times to our own, which, 
though they might or might not take as their first premise a 
religious concept, yet in their organisations were purely rational, 
and were regarded as possessing universal validity. 
When the heyday of science came in the eighteenth century 
and again in the nineteenth, ethics, because its facts So obviously 
challenge observation, naturally fell an early prey to the scientific 
method. Naturally, too, the positivists, with their eye to 
systematising all human knowledge upon purely rational lines, 
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and of casting forth from their intellectual workshop all possible 
metaphysical or theological explanations for purely physical or 
human phenomena, went gloriously to work to found a science of 
morals. Comte found the moral law to be no more than the 
expression of the social law, and that the highest. Ethics is thus 
no more than a chapter of what might be called social physics, a 
part of social science. Its laws are discovered, like laws in any 
other science, physical or biological, by observation and induction. 
Like the laws of physics, and chemistry, and biology, these laws 
may be stated and must be obeyed, for men in society have found 
that only by obeying them the welfare of society and the indi-
vidual is conserved. That he reaffirmed the greater number of 
the laws of the decalogue only went to show that ethical laws are 
not mere matters of changing social caprice, but are truly mani-
festations of the abiding intellectual substrate of society. 
But this evidently did not go far enough with the thorough-
going positivist. The connection between the categorical impera-
tive and the facts observed still left much to be desired. The 
method of science must be to observe facts and from these to 
come by induction to such laws as seem to govern human conduct. 
N ow one postulate assumed by all earlier ethical theories seemed 
quite unwarranted, the notion of obligation, the idea that final 
necessity imposes such or such a line of conduct upon man and 
forbids the opposite. This imperative they could not by any 
observation of the mere facts discover behind human conduct. 
A pure induction, when it proceeds from facts of conduct to the 
generalisation that such modes of conduct are imperative, finds 
itself committing a most vicious saltum. For science does not 
recognise the categorical imperative. Even such laws in physics 
as that of universal gravitation do not connote to us any such 
notion as duty or moral obligation. Hence we must disabuse our 
minds of the idea that these so-called laws of conduct rest upon 
any final idea of logical or moral necessity. As Victor Brochard 
so aptly put it: "It is necessary to think of ethics quite differ-
rently from what is done ordinarily. It must be completely 
separated from theology, made to descend from sky to earth and 
in a sort to be laicised .... The ideas of obligation, of duty, and 
those that cling to these, must be thrust aside, as finding no place 
in an ethics purely scientific and rational." 
Thus we find ourselves not far from the position of the anti-
intellectualist in science, though to be sure here in Brochard and 
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in his followers, as we shall see, the appeal is always to logic and 
reason. But it is to a logic hobbled to facts merely of observation. 
The laws of morals are well enough in their way as statements of 
certain modi operandi, they are certain modes of social procedure, 
generalised more or less imperfectly from incomplete observation 
of facts; but they bear clearly the marks of their relativity. The 
only real things are the facts, the laws possess merely a transient 
reality, like that of a face seen in a mirror. 
This position is made still stronger by the ethical generalisa-
tions of such men as Durkheim and Levy-Bruhl. To these, 
ethics is something which can be stated, modified perhaps, but to 
which can be given neither philosophical theory, nor practical 
system. I t does not reside in intentions, but merely in acts. It 
can be observed in the ensemble of common acts which are univer-
sally approved by a given milieu. Those acts are moral which 
conform to the common habits, and those immoral which do not. 
Ethics is sociology. 
Nothing is more heartlessly barren than this sociological 
ethics. Its origin is as commonplace as learning to eat with a 
knife and fork. "Collective habit expresses itself for all in a 
formula which is repeated from mouth to mouth and is trans-
mitted by education, and fixed by literature. Such is the origin 
and nature of judicial laws, morals . . . articles of faith into 
which religious or political sects condense their beliefs. . . . 
Rules, judgments, morals, religious dogma, systems of finance, all 
depend entirely upon beliefs and recognised usage." These are 
imposed by society, and by society alone upon the individual. 
If we think these notions come from man's inner nature or from 
his reasoning faculties we deceive ourselves. "We are the dupes 
of an illusion which makes us believe that we have elaborated 
ourselves that which is imposed upon us from without. . . . It 
is necessary that sociology free itself of those false ideas which 
dominate the vulgar mind, that it remove, once for all, the yoke 
of the categorical imperative, which long habit ends by making 
tyrannical. . . . It belongs to the sociologist to escape the empire 
of vulgar notions, and turn his attention to facts." 
From this it naturally follows that ethics must purge its mind 
of any notion that it has a part to play in the drama of saving or 
uplifting humanity. It sits at a broad window and sees the 
procession of humanity pass, but it must never lend a hand to 
meliorate human manners, for it has no eye for an ideal; it is the 
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stock-ticker, the impersonal recording clerk, while humanity 
strives, stumbles, falls, wallows, hopeful, dry-eyed, despairing, 
in this welter of conflicting forces that makes life. For ethics 
"is first of all independent of philosophy .... It has nothing to 
do with reform." It has no ideal. I 
And this idea is still more mercilessly set forth by the sociolo-
gist Levy-Bruhl. But why quote from his dreary pages. Ethics 
can state only what is done, not what should be done. Moralists 
should renounce the idea of giving men laws or normative princi-
ples. Poor humanity marches by a path, and we can tell how it 
is marching; science can throw a pale glimmer of light on the way. 
We may know how we are marching, but not where, and much 
less whither it were best to gO.2 
I t was quite to be expected that the revolt from this suicide of 
ethics when it came would be a severe one. And revolt there has 
been, only it antedated the fullest exploitation of sociological 
ethics. If custom is the only morals, if it has no deeper roots in 
human nature than mere passive obedience to social habit, then 
let us at least break the bonds of this unmanly subservience. 
Let us at least have one ideal in human life; if it cannot be morals, 
then let it be the one thing that divides us from the supine tracta-
bility of domesticated animals; let us assert our free, human 
personality. Nietzsche, the disrupter of all social obligations, is 
in essence no more immoral than the sociologists, Durkheim and 
Levy-Bruhl. Rationality and logic and intellect are humanisti-
cally no more irrational and illogical and anti-intellectual in 
Nietzsche than in the school he so bitterly denounced. "The 
moral sentiment in Europe at present is perhaps as subtle, di-
verse, sensitive, and refined, as the' science of morals' belonging 
thereto is recent, initial, awkward, and coarse-fingered." As 
with the sociologist so with Nietzsche there are no morals, but 
only actions. "There are no such things as moral phenomena, 
I Durkheim, Les Regles de la Methode Sociologique, as before. 
2 See in this connection an excellent article in Revue des Deux Mondes, 
August I, IS, I9II, by Fonsegrive, entitled "La Morale Contemporaine." To 
show how general this idea is with even" tender-thoughted" sociologists I quote 
from a recent book. The writer has a New England conscience, but when 
inoculated by this virus writes: "All history shows us the truth of this 
principle. Moral forces, if fruitful, are not static; they are related to economic 
necessities of their respective periods. Obedience, for instance, so inoperative 
to-day, was rightly the chief virtue of medireval society." Vida D. Scudder, 
Socialism and Character. 
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but only a moral interpretation of phenomena." So, as the 
title of his Beyond Good and Evil indicates, he begins his disqui-
sition on ethics by denying its real existence. "Every system 
of morals is a sort of tyranny against 'nature' and also against 
'reason,' for it is a restraint." And thus he begins his panegyric 
of Dionysian self-conservatism and self-glorification, for life 
knows neither good nor evil, it is free, creative, joyous, ironic, 
intense, self-actively triumphant over every obstacle. Its 
formula is as simple as its manifestation is complex; it is mere 
"Will to Power." 
But it is only the rare soul that can through intuition under-
stand the full significance of this Dionysian spontaneity, and see 
the utter futility of the softer virtues. "The noble and brave 
who think thus are the farthest removed from the morality which 
sees precisely in sympathy, or in acting for the good of others, or in 
desinteressement the characteristic of the moral. They are the 
creators of values. They honour whatever they recognise in 
themselves: such morality is self-glorification." Opposed to 
this is the "morality of utility," morality of the slave. "It is 
here that sympathy, the kind helping hand, the warm heart, pa-
tience, diligence, humility, and friendliness attain to honour: for 
him these are the most useful qualities, and almost the only means 
of supporting the burden of existence .... Everywhere that slave-
morality gains the ascendency, language shows a tendency to 
approximate the significance of the words' good' and' stupid.' " 
Thus at a blow Nietzsche would destroy the very foundations 
of a possible morals-its universality. Every act is purely rela-
tive, a fraction with its numerator, the creative agency of the 
spontaneous personality, and its denominator, the tantalisingly 
insistent, universal Will to Power. " Master-morality" is 
nothing more than the resolute, sleepless expansion of man's 
personality, which Talus-like with iron flail levels every obstacle; 
it is an itch for action which no thought, no action may relieve. 
"Slave-morality" is an utter falsehood masking itself in pleasant 
sounding terms that deceive nobody but the slave. Communica-
tion, intercourse, save that between master and slave, there can 
be none. "My opinion is my opinion: another person has not 
easily a right to it .... One must renounce the bad task of 
wishing to agree with many people. ' Good' is no longer good 
when one's neighbour takes it into his mouth. And how could 
there be a 'common good' ! " 
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Thus from opposite sides, but by their common ignoring of 
intentions and their apotheosis of pure action, the sociologists and 
the individualists in ethics bring their reasoning to a common 
end, the death of morals. The one kills slowly by smothering it 
under the accumulated load of social habit, the other poisons 
it in the perfumed and drugged atmosphere of personal caprice. 
The one makes good statistics, the other decadent poetry. The 
one brings men to haunt the market, the street-comer, the places 
unspeakable, the other to prostitute history and romance to glut 
its megalomania with the sins of arch-tyrants and courtesans. 
For grant, with the first, that all facts are, so far as human nature 
is concerned, equally significant; then we have only one touch-
stone by which we may test their artistic or literary fitness, their 
emotional value. Hence the ruck of pictures, poems, and stories 
dealing with idiots, paupers, monsters, misfits generally, in 
bizarre, demoralising, or dehumanising situations. Emotional 
significance is the only test the other school can find, and to real-
ise it art and literature must seek the lives of those who defy 
humanity and human tradition. There is little to choose between 
them. 
IV 
There are two things that stand out in these scientific, philo-
sophical, and ethical anti-intellectualists: first, a hatred of form, 
of generalisation, of meaning and significance, of concepts-in a 
word, of the static conception of life and reality, which to them 
implies dogma and determinism, and for which they would sub-
stitute a dynamic or flowing, meaningless conception of life and 
reality, which gives elbow room and fresh air for free creation 
and eccentric personality; and, second, a hypnotic worship of 
isolated fact and undirected action, wherein each fact, whether it 
be the sputter of an electric arc or the death rattle of disappointed 
endeavour, is of equal value on the stock-ticker's record which 
they call life. 
I t is not wi thin my province to go far in a criticism of these 
anti-intellectualist scientists and philosophers, had I the power. 
In much their position owes its strength to the lengths to which 
the pseudo-intellectualists went in the heyday of Hegelian 
idealism on the one hand andof mid-nineteenth-century scientific 
materialism on the other. The pure intellect, as Pascal once for 
all, and Plato, too, pointed out, can never unaided arrive at a 
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complete survey of anything save its own limitations. But it 
is the chief aid we have in organising this welter of experience we 
call life, and without its careful generalisations we should be in a 
sorry way indeed. And the findings which it has by its powers of 
induction and deduction made gqod, the relations which it estab-
lishes between the separate details of experience, the significance 
and insignificance which it points out in life, must per se possess 
for us so much of reality. Determinism there must be in life, 
but freedom also in that we can wrest from the apparently 
fatal law of cause and effect a means to a nobler triumph of free 
personality and nobility of character. I And this triumph is not 
less a tribute to our intellect than to our intuition. 
But nobility of character, or true freedom, is not a quality 
which possesses merely emotional significance. It is not merely 
an end, but also a means to further conquest; and its sign is not 
cessation of action, or capriciousness of action, but action that 
reduces some part of the flux of reality into rational order. 
Nobility of character is nobility simply because it is able to act in 
a certain orderly way in spite of nature and in accordance with 
certain rational laws. That these laws mayor may not be in 
accordance with nature is beside the mark-they are human, of 
human worth and significance. They are the sole bulwark which 
man these thousands of years has learned to set up against the 
awful ravages of brute nature; and in so far as he obeys them he 
asserts his humanity as opposed to his barbarism. Even a child 
knows that if he turns around a sufficient number of times and 
ra pidl y enough the earth and sky will seem to reel in wildest 
confusion, but is it the part of a man after gazing on the mad 
dance of life and nature to assert confidently that the rational 
order on which he stands has caught the whirl of his vertigo? 
What then, shall we say of this new spirit of revolt against 
the tyranny of the intellect, as the anti-intellectualists phrase it? 
I believe it can be reduced almost to a formula. It is, of course, 
not a new thing in human thought, and its symptoms are easily 
discernible. In the eighteenth century, shortly after Locke 
wrote his famous Essay Concerning Human Understanding and 
Newton his Principia, there arose an immense faith in the powers 
of pure reason, and men devoted their lives to the solution of 
every problem by its unaided efforts. As a result there were 
I See an excellent article by my friend Professor H. B. Alexander in the 
Journal of the American Society for Pyschical Research, October, 1913. 
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built up a series of organically developed and marvellously intri-
cate rational structures to house all human activities and to 
provide room for human aspiration and emotion. The world 
has seldom seen such systematised intellectual effort as that of 
Leibnitz, Wolff, Lessing, Adam Smith, and Montesquieu. But 
the world of reality and human emotion, in its higher and lower 
manifestations, felt itself restricted in these orderly and, as their 
opponents said, mechanistically devised schemes of things entire. 
Besides there were a horde of lesser men, men like Voltaire, Dide-
rot, Helvetius, and the Encyclopedists in general, who abused the 
reason they claimed to serve; and a host of artists and writers 
who contented themselves with slavish imitation of the form, not 
catching the spirit of the masters. The natural reaction followed 
in the anti-intellectualism of Rousseau, with its adoration of 
pure and unrestrained passion, and in the critical work of Kant, 
who showed by his antinomies the exact limitations of the 
intellectual powers. The anti-intellectualism of Rousseau was 
due to a complete misunderstanding of the nature and of the 
province of the human reason, owing to the misuse of reason by 
those who had attempted to speak in its name. The antinomies 
of Kant were due, mathematicians say, to the insufficient mathe-
matics of his time. 
The same phenomenon is taking place in our day. The mid-
nineteenth century saw again a revival of science. With Spencer 
and Haecke1 scientific dogmatism went so far as would have 
shocked its earlier votaries. Literature, history, sociology, 
almost every department of human thought, has felt its chilling 
intrusion. 1: Again there has arisen the feeling that the deeper 
problems of reality have been left untouched, and as a result men 
are turning to rend reason, because, they say, reason and science 
are synonymous. To show that reason and science are not 
always even in accord, and that, at best, scientific thought is but 
one of the many manifestations of our rational processes is no 
argument for them, for such men are above reason, using it only 
when they desire to set forth its insufficiency. 
It is a truism that life and reality is a monstrum, horrendum, 
informe, ingens, to which the light of reason is denied. The 
humanist knows this as well as the anti-intellectualist. He knows 
I See "Intrusions of Science," by my.colleague and friend, Mr. S. B. Gass, 
MID-WEST QUARTERLY, vol. i., I. 
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that his rational world is a thin'veneer separating him from the 6 
formless welter, and his effort is directed to making its weaknesses 
strong, to rendering human life amenable to human law; and to 
do this he knows that he must. renounce much in order that his 
ears may not be stunned· and his balance lost and his reason 
swallowed up in the turmoil below. He sees that life itself is 
essentially non-significant, therefore he strives to make that 
part of it that falls to his lot significant for much; he perceives that 
disorder abounds; he sets to work to put his little world in order; 
in a word, his attention is fixed on that portion of life and reality 
which he can take into himself and render orderly. Beyond that, 
the nature of things themselves, he knows, is unknowable. The 
anti-intellectualist also sees that the order in the world of reason 
has little consanguinity with the great world of life and reality 
without; and because of this discrepancy he lifts his heel against 
reason. I t is as though a man should spurn the raft that saves 
him, and because it is not solid earth leap to his destruction. It 
is all a question of emphasis,-which is more worthy of human 
consideration, the reason that sets man apart from brute life, 
whether of men or beasts or of stocks and stones; or the fl~ of 
life itself, which also we may enter, "for wide is the gate and 
many there be that go in thereat." 
And now we may answer the question at the beginning of this 
paper. Is this glimpse of reality, which anti-intellectualist science 
and metaphysics so truculently announce can be gained onlyby 
abandoning our rational birthright,-is this the promised land for 
art and letters, or is it but a shimmering mirage? The question has -
almost answered itself. If art and crea ti ve Ii tera ture have as their . 
purpose to destroy the distinction between nature and human 1 
nature, to reduce both to isolated fact or to the undifferentiated 
flux of becoming, then the futurist in art and many of our near 
futurists in letters are right. For both would lay bare the heart 
and soul of life and nature in search for the" one touch of nature 
that makes the whole world kin." But our literary and artistic 
tradition has long pointed another way. There is no shuffling 
here. Such essentially human things as character, reason, ideals, . 
morals, though we may look in vain for them in the flux, though 
they may be conventions or more or less'inadequate generalisa-
tions, must not be regarded as a flippancy, an irrelevancy, a 
cosmic jest. And it is with these human things that art and 
literature have to do. One grows a little weary to-day at the 
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ceaseless iteration of the talistP.anic words "heart and soul." 
In itself it is enough to raise the suspicion that perhaps it is 
all an offering up of incense on the altar of a vanished deity; 
for" when love begins to sicken a.nd decay, it useth an enforced 
ceremony." 
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